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Stealing What’s Free: Exploring Compensation to Body
Parts Sources for Their Contribution to Profitable
Biomedical Research
JO-ANNE YAU *
The great tragedy of Science—the slaying of a beautiful hypothesis
by an ugly fact.
—T.H. Huxley, Biogenesis and Abiogenesis

I. INTRODUCTION
At first blush, donating body parts in the name of science appears to be
a beautiful solution to the problem of scarce body parts for research advancements. But a closer investigation reveals an ugly fact: the philanthropic donors—referred to as “Sources” in this article—are subjected to
physical and financial exploitation.
Sources play a crucial and indispensable role in biotechnology. Without human body parts, most medical discoveries would not have been possible. Handsome profits can be derived from successful discoveries. But
currently in the United States, when a Source provides body parts for research purposes, the researcher, research foundation, and outside investors
are only a few of the parties who may claim a financial stake in the profits
of this research. The Source is the only party excluded from being financially compensated for his contribution. 1 Despite being a key player in
ground-breaking medical discoveries, legal and political rhetoric block
Sources from rightful compensation.
In this article, “Source compensation” will refer to a proportionate
share of the research profits set aside for the Source as a result of his contribution. Today, Source compensation is prohibited. Laws are slow in
reacting to technological change and resulting societal needs. The progress
of Source compensation is hampered by stubborn, archaic attitudes about
* Associate, Wood, Atter & Associates, P.A., Jacksonville, Florida. The author would like to
thank Elizabeth A. Rowe, Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Florida, College of Law, for
her insight and input from this article’s conception to completion.
1. John A. Sten, Comment, Rethinking the National Organ Transplant Program: When Push
Comes to Shove, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 197, 200 (1994).
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the value of the human body. However, this article will address the subtle
movements in the law toward Source compensation and the constitutional
soundness of this practice. Furthermore, public policy discussions, ethical
implications, and comparisons with other socially embraced practices will
highlight variations on Source compensation that are already prevalent in
society, and demonstrate that the concept is not so foreign after all.
II. THE UPHILL BATTLE: SOURCE COMPENSATION AND THE LAW
A. The Common Law Analysis
1. History
“The law marche[s] with medicine, but in the rear and limping a little.” 2 This reflection illustrates a struggle to move forward in unison, due
to a judicial system that is slow to resolve issues when compared with the
swift developments made in biotechnology. The law lags behind for a
number of reasons. First, unlike areas such as tort law or commercial law,
there is no field of law specifically focused on human biological materials
or medical advances. 3 Instead, biotechnology and medical lawsuits rely
upon a mosaic of related fields. Second, whereas common law waits for an
issue to ripen and for parties to gain standing before reflecting upon past
injuries, many issues in biotechnology introduce possibilities that have
never before been imagined. Third, it is entirely possible that biotechnology disputes could be rendered moot by the time the issues are resolved,
due to the time disparity between the lengthy legal process and the speed at
which the latest medical findings become obsolete. While common law
must be credited with gaining some ground in biotechnology, its journey in
the direction toward Source compensation is just beginning.
The following case studies illustrate three issues central to the debate
over Source compensation: (1) informed consent; (2) profit potentials concealed from Sources; and (3) personal autonomy in body parts.
2. The “Informed Consent” Hurdle
The catalyst initiating any medical procedure is informed consent. A
physician has the expertise essential in evaluating the risks and benefits of
2. Sir Zelman Cowen, Symposium, In the Rear and Limping a Little: Some Reflections on Medicine, Biotechnology and the Law: The Roscoe Pound Lectures, 64 NEB. L. REV. 548, 550 (1985).
3. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS—SPECIAL REPORT, OTA-BA-337 9 (1987).
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proceeding or abstaining from treatment. In contrast, while lacking medical expertise, the patient has the prerogative to determine the course of
treatment, if any. 4 That is, the patient has a “right of self-decision” when
consenting to treatment. 5 It is the physician’s duty to disclose all material
information, such that the patient is empowered to make an intelligent decision regarding his own health. 6 Thus, the patient has a blind trust for his
physician, by virtue of medical knowledge, which gives rise to a fiduciary
physician-patient relationship. 7 An accepted standard for measuring the
adequacy of informed consent is the objective test: whether a prudent person in the same situation, who had been informed of all relevant risks and
benefits, would have done as the patient did. 8
Traditionally, informed consent referred only to medical treatment.
However, the landmark case of Moore v. Regents of the University of California extends the definition to require that physicians “disclose personal
interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or economic,
that may affect [the physician’s] judgment.” 9 Yet, despite demanding a
patient’s informed consent, Moore illustrated the judiciary’s reluctance to
compensate a Source for a contribution that ultimately yielded tremendous
profits.
John Moore of California was diagnosed with leukemia in 1976. 10 His
physician, Dr. Golde, told Moore that his life depended on a splenectomy. 11 For seven years, Moore continued to receive Golde’s treatments,
including numerous extractions of blood, tissue, and body fluids. 12 Golde
insisted that these procedures were “necessary and required for [Moore’s]
health and well-being, and [Moore continued these visits] based upon the
trust inherent in and by virtue of the physician-patient relationship.” 13
Unbeknownst to Moore, these “treatments” had no relationship to treating
his condition. 14 Instead, Golde and his associates had an ulterior motive
for collecting the body parts: Moore’s cells had very rare qualities with
enormous financial potential. 15 These researchers secured for themselves
the exclusive and unlimited access to these cells by exploiting Moore’s

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 9 (Cal. 1972).
Id. at 11.
Id. at 10.
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990).
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
793 P.2d at 485.
Id. at 481.
Surgical procedure where the spleen is removed.
Moore, 793 P.2d at 481.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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fiduciary physician-patient relationship with Golde. 16 The fruits of
Golde’s research yielded a patent on a cell line derived from Moore’s body
parts. 17 Moore was not informed of his role in the development of this
profitable, cutting-edge product, much less compensated for it. Ultimately,
the patented cell line earned over $440,000 and 75,000 shares of common
stock in a biotechnology company for Golde and his associates. 18
Because Moore had no property rights to his body parts under the law,
the court refused to recognize his conversion claim as actionable. 19 Thus,
while the Moore court recognized that Golde breached a fiduciary duty to
Moore by failing to provide informed consent regarding the purpose of
performing the extractions, the court refused to offer Moore any financial
redress. 20
This holding has a significant impact in the progress of biotechnology.
No longer can physicians abuse their position of trust to remove body
parts—under the guise of providing treatment—to fulfill their own scientific purposes. Sources must be provided with all material information
regarding the fate of their body parts, and then choose to give informed
consent to have their body parts used for those limited purposes. 21 Furthermore, the scientist’s full disclosure gives Sources an opportunity to
learn about the value of their bodies, and the significance of their impact
on biotechnology. Appreciation of their bargaining power is the first step
in Source compensation.
Nonetheless, Moore’s informed consent still has loopholes. Most significant is that a researcher need only disclose that he intends to perform
experiments on the Source’s body parts, 22 not that the research product
could yield financial profit. Thus, while the Source is empowered with the
present value of his body, he is still ignorant of the potential value, and
blind to the possible wealth a few of his cells may earn for the researcher.
Furthermore, despite other jurisdictions’ support of Moore, 23 courts in
other jurisdictions continue to take steps backward since the Moore decision, dismissing Sources’ attempts to integrate research intentions into
informed consent. 24

16. Id.
17. Id. at 482.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 497.
20. Id. at 485, 497.
21. Id. at 497.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., In re Cincinnati Radiation Litig., 874 F. Supp. 796 (S.D. Ohio 1995); Grimes v. Kennedy Grieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001).
24. See, e.g., Hecht v. Kaplan, 645 N.Y.S.2d 51 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
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3. The “Fraudulent Concealment” Hurdle
While withholding medical knowledge constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty, withholding financial knowledge pertaining to the profits of research can constitute fraudulent concealment. However, as evidenced in
Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Research Institute, Inc., 25 to state
an enforceable fraudulent concealment action, there are specific standards
to overcome. 26
In Greenberg, eight Florida parents had children suffering from Canavan disease, a rare and fatal hereditary disorder. 27 They sought Dr.
Matalon to discover the genetic cause. 28 The parents provided Matalon
with blood and tissue samples “for the specific purpose of researching Canavan disease,” with the understanding that “Matalon’s research would
remain in the public domain to promote the discovery of more effective
prevention techniques and treatments and, eventually, to effectuate a
cure.” 29 By 1993, Matalon and his associates identified the gene responsible for Canavan disease. 30 In 1997, Matalon patented his work, granting
him exclusive access to the Canavan gene and all its related testing, therapy, and research. 31 The parents did not learn of the patent until 1998,
after Matalon had already received over $75,000 in royalties. 32
Fraudulent concealment is actionable under Florida law. The Greenberg court reasoned that fraudulent concealment is enforceable only when
heightened standards are satisfied. 33 Specifically, not only does the Source
bear the burden of proving the elements, 34 but the Source must also state
the circumstances of the fraud with particularity according to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 9(b); that is, the “who, what, when, where, and how.” 35
Thus, although the parents argued that they would not have made their
contributions if Matalon disclosed his intent to commercialize their body
parts for his own financial benefit, the Greenberg court refused to recog-

25. 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. Fla. 2003).
26. Id. at 1073.
27. Id. at 1066.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1067.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1067-68.
33. Id. at 1073.
34. Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1335, 1339 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (defining fraudulent
concealment as a misrepresentation of a material fact or suppression of the truth that induced detrimental reliance, and the fact was one which the representor: (a) knew was false; (b) was unsure whether the
fact was true or false; or (c) ought to have known was false).
35. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 (7th Cir. 1990).
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nize their fraudulent concealment action because the parents could not satisfy the heightened threshold. 36
Greenberg places an unreasonable burden upon the Source. The
Source is already at a disadvantage due to a lack of scientific education, as
recognized by jurisdictions demanding informed consent. Fraudulent concealment in the biotechnology context is different from other fraudulent
concealment claims in that the researcher may be the only one with the
specific, technical knowledge to understand the particulars of the fraud.
This unreasonably high threshold sets a dangerous precedent: a scientist
may intentionally withhold disclosure of his use of body parts for his own
financial gain, despite knowledge of the Sources’ wishes to the contrary,
and the court will dismiss the fraudulent concealment claim. 37
4. The “Autonomy Over One’s Body” Hurdle
The fraudulent concealment claim is not the only “carrot on a stick”
for Sources; other potential claims can be just as difficult to justify. For
example, in some states, Sources cannot argue unjust enrichment, a contractual inequity, because body parts are not formally recognized as property that can be exchanged for consideration. 38 In fact, much of the difficulty stems from the debate over whether Sources can be granted property
rights in their bodies. While there is no distinct area of law focused on
human biological materials or medical advances to resolve this issue, other
fields of law have successfully argued to provide Sources with relief. For
example, in Hecht v. Superior Court, 39 the court deferred to property law
and estate law to determine that sperm should be described as property and
allowed its devise according to the deceased’s will. 40
In Hecht, forty-eight year-old William Kane wished to bear another
child with his girlfriend, Deborah Hecht. 41 In 1991, Kane wrote a letter to
be read after his death: “I address this to my children, because, although I
have only two . . . it may be that Deborah will decide—as I hope she
will—to have a child by me after my death. I’ve been assiduously generating frozen sperm samples for that eventuality.” 42

36. Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1074 (S.D.
Fla. 2003).
37. Id.
38. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19(a)-280 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (2004).
39. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
40. Id. at 283.
41. Id. at 277.
42. Id.
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Kane died a few weeks after this letter was written, and Hecht sought
to become pregnant with the sperm left to her. 43 Kane’s adult children
challenged the will, demanding that all fifteen vials of sperm be destroyed. 44 They argued that preventing posthumous children is essential to
preserving the family unit. 45 Contrary to overwhelming case law specifically refusing to grant property rights to body parts, 46 the Hecht court described sperm as “the seed of life . . . tied to the fundamental liberty of a
human being to conceive or not to conceive. . . . [T]he fate of the sperm
must be decided by the person from whom it is drawn.” 47 In essence, the
court granted Kane a power of autonomy over his body parts to devise as
he chooses, and further granted Hecht a limited property right to use the
sperm only as Kane intended.
In addition to the progress made toward property recognition in body
parts, Hecht is a crucial decision for proponents of Source compensation,
because it enforces a Source’s right to make choices about his body parts:
to whom they would belong, for what purpose they would serve, and the
circumstances surrounding their destiny.
In the spirit of Hecht, some courts reached as far as treating preembryonic cells as property in disposition disputes, although not specifically granting “property” status. 48 It is notable that these cases all deal
with reproductive cells, which, by virtue of their potential as “the seed of
life,” 49 have more significant personal value to the Source than other cells
or body parts. Accordingly, other body parts with presumably less sentimental attachment, such as skin or bone, should likewise be treated as
property.
Seeking “property” status in one’s body is, however, not material to
Source compensation. Rather, regardless of property status, Sources
should be able to choose the fate of their body parts and, as a corollary, be
compensated for their choices, if they so decide.

43. Id. at 278.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 279.
46. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Children’s Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D.
Fla. 2003); Miles v. Scripps Clinic & Research Found., 810 F. Supp. 1091 (S.D. Cal. 1993); Moore v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990).
47. Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
48. See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn.
1992).
49. E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of PostMortem Insemination, 1 J.L. & HEALTH 229, 232 (1985).
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B. The Statutory Analysis
Because common law authority in biotechnology has been generally
uncharted territory, legislative enactments have attempted to shape permissible and prohibited activity, albeit in a direction away from Source compensation. Directed at issues regarding exchange of organs for transplants
or medical research, Congress passed two acts: the National Organ Transplantation Act (NOTA) and the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA).
1. The National Organ Transplantation Act
In 1984, Congress passed NOTA, 50 prohibiting the sale of organs for
transplantation purposes. 51 Specifically, NOTA imposes a $50,000 maximum fine and/or up to five years imprisonment for the buying and selling
of all human organs “for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.” 52
Although initially enacted to prevent a commercial market for organs, 53 NOTA is not as difficult an obstacle to overcome as the common
law where movements toward Source compensation are concerned. First,
NOTA applies only to organs, and makes no reference to cells, tissues, or
fluids. Second, NOTA applies only to transplants—no reference is made
to body parts used for research purposes. Thus, it is conceivable that financial compensation for human cells, tissues, or fluids for research purposes is permissible under NOTA. However, a third, and a most troubling
short-coming of NOTA, is an exception to the interstate commerce prohibition. Organ transplants should not significantly affect interstate commerce; however, this prohibition does not apply to “payments associated
with removal, transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses of travel, housing, and lost wages incurred by the donor of a human organ in connection
with donation of the organ.” 54 Essentially, this NOTA exception applies to
everyone but the Source. This exclusion inequitably excludes Sources,
since all parties involved in the transaction—even those performing medically unrelated tasks—may reap financial benefits in addition to compensation for expenses and wages. Regardless of whether legislatures uninten-

50. National Organ Transplant Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (1984) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 201, 273, 274e (2006)).
51. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a) (2006).
52. Id.
53. Lloyd R. Cohen, Organ Transplant Market Would Save Lives, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 29, 1996, at A19.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 274e(a), (c)(2) (2006).
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tionally left out Sources’ interests, NOTA unfairly prevents equitable compensation to Sources for their contributions.
2. The Uniform Anatomical Gift Act
By 1973, UAGA was adopted by all fifty states. 55 It provides that an
individual who is at least eighteen years of age may donate his organs upon
death. 56 In 1987, UAGA was amended to expressly prohibit the sale or
purchase of a body part for transplantation or therapy. 57 Conceivably, the
sale or purchase of body parts could be permissible if done for research.
Again, UAGA’s applicability to Source compensation may be limited.
Mainly, since Sources would likely be making inter vivos transfers, UAGA
would not require donation of body parts.
Thus, while Congress has attempted to alleviate problems between
Sources and researchers, its enactments need significant updating to meet
new research demands. Currently, Sources have some leeway to interpret
NOTA and UAGA as favoring Source compensation as discussed. However, due to the vagueness of enforceable rights as outlined in case law, the
legislature must recognize financial disparities between researchers and
Sources, and protect Sources from this inequity.
C. The Constitutional Analysis
1. Griswold v. Connecticut—The Penumbral Right to Privacy
There is, of course, no specific “right to Source compensation” in the
United States Constitution. However, a right could be constitutionally
protected even if it is not expressly enumerated. 58 As described in Griswold, “specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.” 59 In other words, while the Constitution specifically outlines citizens’ rights, a penumbra is a broadened interpretation of the Constitution
applied in the context of people’s lives. It is this penumbra that brings
rights to life. Under the penumbra of the Fourth Amendment, 60 Griswold

55. Cohen, supra note 53.
56. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(a) (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 99 (1968).
57. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 10(a) (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 25 (Supp. 1990).
58. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
59. Id. at 484 (finding unconstitutional a state statute prohibiting a physician from prescribing contraceptives to a married woman, as the governmental intrusion encroached on her rights to privacy).
60. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (preventing warrantless governmental intrusions upon one’s home and
person).
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identified guaranteed zones of privacy. 61 As a fundamental liberty, the
right to privacy is considered a right implicit in the concept of ordered liberty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 and is
offered the highest protection.
2. Roe v. Wade—Furthering the Right to Privacy
The penumbral right to privacy has been interpreted to mean a right to
personal autonomy. 63 Just as the issue in Roe was not the right to have an
abortion, Sources do not argue that they have a right to be compensated. In
Roe, a woman successfully challenged a statute prohibiting her from having an abortion on grounds that the statute invaded her privacy. 64 She did
not argue her right to have an abortion; instead, she argued that under the
penumbra of her fundamental right to privacy, she should be able to have
the procedure done without governmental interference. 65 The Supreme
Court agreed. 66 Therefore, the right to privacy must not be confused with
the right to conduct the named activity. Rather, while there may be no
specifically enumerated right to engage in this activity, penumbral protection is conferred upon the privacy to engage in this activity. It is also worthy to note that although Source compensation has raised considerable controversy among opponents, it pales in comparison to the magnitude of controversy and publicity concerning abortion. Logically then, the penumbra
of privacy protecting abortion decisions from governmental intrusion
should also extend to Source compensation. As privacy is recognized as a
fundamental right, opponents would thus have to overcome the strict scrutiny of the courts.
3. The Contracts Clause
Furthermore, under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Contracts Clause
prevents legislative acts from impairing the contractual relationship between parties, unless a sufficient governmental interest can be shown. 67
Thus, between Griswold and Roe and their progeny, combined with the
Contracts Clause, Sources have constitutional rights to be free from governmental intrusions into their private activities, and into their rights to
contract. In other words, Sources should have the same penumbral right to
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 120.
Id. at 129.
Id. at 153-54.
Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 589 (1819).
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privacy and personal autonomy to enter into contractual relationships to
exchange body parts for consideration without governmental intrusion.
Although Sources should have the right to contract as guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibitions restricting
this freedom are subject to the lowest level of scrutiny. As long as the
government has a legitimate objective bearing a rational relationship to the
means chosen to achieve that goal, that prohibition will be upheld.
4. Legitimate Government Objectives
While the government may oppose transactions involving body parts in
exchange for consideration by arguing that it has an interest in guarding the
health of the public, it is the researchers’ and physicians’ conduct that
should be regulated, not that of the Source. For instance, the quality of the
scientist’s disclosure to potential Sources should be evaluated for quality
and adherence to standard protocol. Regulating the disclosure scientists
must give and prohibiting concealment of material information from
Sources would account for guarding the health of the public, who have the
right of privacy to choose a plan of action in their own best interest. Another example would be in imposing greater accountability upon scientists
to maintain accurate records of whose body parts contributed to which
discoveries. As will be discussed below, the administrative demand upon
scientists is no more demanding than those already encountered on a regular basis. In addition, researchers and physicians are the ones with extensive knowledge of their experiments and the consequences of participation,
so the government should hold them to a higher standard of conduct. The
Source, lacking the specialized education and inside information about the
experiments, is in a more vulnerable position. In guarding the health of the
public, the government further ought to protect Sources from scientists
who do not adhere to proper disclosure protocol.
The government may further oppose Source compensation under the
guise of protecting the morals of society. However, while the Constitution
protects the interests of the public, it should neither dictate nor enforce the
public’s morals or beliefs. 68 Moreover, there has been backlash against
laws promoting social morals. For example, in 1998, a United States
Commissioner declared that the Patent and Trademark Office would reject
biotechnology patents that were “injurious to the well-being, good policy,

68. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (stating that “the Constitution is not the formulation of the merely personal views of the members of this Court, nor can its
authority be reduced to the claim that state officials are its controlling interpreters”).
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or good morals of society.” 69 Not only was the Commissioner attacked for
presuming authority to enforce such prohibitions, but the statement
launched public outcry against prohibitions on biotechnology grounded in
moral arguments. 70
Source compensation is a practice that should be afforded the highest
constitutional protection as a fundamental right of privacy, in addition to
constitutionally protecting Sources’ right to contract as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause. Furthermore, the
government should guard the interests of its citizens by supporting and
enforcing Source compensation.
III. THE VALUE OF BODY PARTS
Biotechnology in the United States is a multi-billion dollar industry. 71
In recent years, disagreements arise as to the exact numbers, but to place
the value in context, in 1984, periodicals in the biotechnology industry
predicted a potential market for a specific type of white blood cells at over
three billion dollars by 1990. 72 Another example reflecting the magnitude
of wealth invested in biotechnology is the national budget. The National
Institute of Health (NIH) is one of many agencies controlled by the Department of Health and Human Services. 73 Yet in 2004, the President’s
budget for the NIH was $27.9 billion. 74 Considering the numerous fields
of research—most of which are associated with public, private, and corporate contributions—biotechnology can be considered one of the most profitable industries. The economic inequity is obvious: this industry’s success
relies upon Source contributions, yet the industry uses current law and legislative acts as an excuse to avoid compensating Sources.
The public’s ignorance as to the value of the human body in research
allows Sources to be financially and physically exploited. Body parts have
value to the scientific community both as a tool to conduct research, and
financially, as the final product of the research. For the public to understand the value of human parts in medical research, they must first appreci69. Meredith Wadman, . . . As U.S. Office Claims Right to Rule on Morality, 393 NATURE 200, 200
(1998).
70. David Dickson, Legal Fight Looms Over Patent Bid on Human/Animal Chimaeras, 392 NATURE
423, 424 (1998).
71. William Boulier, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property Rights
in Human Body Parts, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 693, 694 (1995).
72. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 482 (Cal. 1990).
73. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, http://www.hhs.gov/about/index.html#agencies
(last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
74. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, FY 2004 BUDGET IN BRIEF 32 (2004),
available at http://www.hhs.gov/budget/04budget/fy2004bib.pdf.
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ate the crucial role body parts play in biotechnology: without body parts
from Sources, most medical progress would be severely hampered, if progress occurs at all. In 1987, forty-nine percent of researchers at medical
institutions depended on Source body parts in their work. 75 Until it becomes possible to manufacture body parts in artificial laboratory settings,
human Sources are a dire necessity.
Ignorant of their enormous bargaining power, Sources generally donate, trusting that their body parts are a gift to better mankind. However,
this trust in researchers and doctors could ultimately break down if Sources
were to learn that these scientists turn around and profit from these gifts.
A case in point is blood banks, where Sources give blood without compensation. Blood banks are then permitted to sell the blood to hospitals and
research facilities for a profit, under the guise of either “selling a service”
or “compensating the clinic for costs.” 76
Another obstacle preventing public appreciation for the value of human body parts in medical research is the propagated belief that body parts
should only be afforded dignitary value, rather than commercial value.
While it is a respectable view, it is also an archaic position. As society,
technology, and the human condition progress, notions of acceptable and
unacceptable practices are challenged. For instance, surrogate motherhood
today is a common option that is gaining acceptance, while such an avenue
was shunned, or considered a last resort just a few decades ago. 77
Similarly, Source compensation is a budding issue pressing for resolution. Scandalous incidents over recent decades herald the inevitable: body
parts can command a huge price tag. For example, college students are
commonly compensated financially for providing both regenerative 78 and
non-regenerative 79 body parts. In 2004, the University of California at Los
Angeles became entangled in a legal web for allegedly selling donated

75. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS—SPECIAL REPORT, OTA-BA-337, at 8 (1987).
76. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19(a)-280 (West 1997); DEL. GEN. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2316(5) (2000); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 672.316(5) (West 2002).
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cadavers to prominent pharmaceutical companies. 80 Finally, and most
horrifying, are the overseas reports of organs being stolen from the living
to be sold on the international black market. 81
These examples clearly repudiate the notion that body parts are of no
value. Evidently, biotechnology has transformed the traditional notions of
the body “from merely a source of labor, or food for worms, to a highly
prized biological commodity.” 82 If anything, allowing compensation for a
valuable contribution validates the Source’s dignity by giving him an enforceable stake in the research. 83 Nonetheless, the public’s perception of
the human body’s commercial value is but one obstacle to overcome in
securing compensation for Sources. Not only does legislation fail to protect Sources, but because the government is the primary source of funding, 84 it will continue indirectly to promote Source exploitation by supporting the biotechnology industry.
IV. THE SOURCE SHAREHOLDER SOLUTION
Source compensation proponents have proposed a multitude of solutions. Pennsylvania has launched a pilot program to compensate the
Source for reasonable funeral expenses upon his death. 85 Other supporters
have suggested granting Sources official property rights in their bodies. 86
Still other proponents recommend offering tax incentives. 87 This article,
however, proposes another solution.
The Source Shareholder solution attempts to combat the evils of exploitation from both sides: preventing Sources from demanding compensation from scientists whose research has not yet earned capital, and prevent80. Robert Jablon, Scandal at UCLA Reveals Cadaver Trade as Big Business; Unregulated System
Cited by Specialists (Mar. 10, 2004), http://www.boston.com/news/education/higher/articles/2004/03/
11/scandal_at_ucla_reveals_cadaver_trade_as_big_business.
81. See, e.g., Hugh O’Shaughnessy, Murder and Mutilation Supply Human Organ Trade,
OBSERVER, Mar. 27, 1994, at 27 (disappearing Russian orphans); Charles P. Wallace, For Sale: The
Poor’s Body Parts, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1992, at A1 (kidnapping for kidneys in India).
82. Michael H. Scarmon, Property Rights in the Human Body—Are the Goods Oft Interred with
Their Bones, 37 S.D. L. REV. 429 (1992).
83. Boulier, supra note 71, at 719.
84. U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS—SPECIAL REPORT, OTA-BA-337, at 7 (1987).
85. Laurel R. Siegel, Re-engineering the Laws of Organ Transplantation, 49 EMORY L.J. 917, 917
(2000).
86. See, e.g., Roy Hardiman, Toward the Right of Commerciality: Recognizing Property Rights in
the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. REV. 207 (1986); Emily Denham Morris, The
Organ Trail: Express Versus Presumed Consent as Paths to Blaze in Solving a Critical Shortage, 90
KY. L.J. 1125 (2002); Siegel, supra note 85.
87. See, e.g., Frederick R. Parker, Jr. et al., Organ Procurement & Tax Policy, 2 HOUS. J. HEALTH
L. & POL’Y 173 (2002).
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ing scientists from ignoring the Sources’ contribution. The Source Shareholder solution is modeled after the shareholder system used by corporations, and is intended to spread the wealth from the industry to all contributors, including Sources.
The mechanism of compensation is simple. After a researcher obtains
the body part, the Source would retain a percent (or fraction of) interest in
the researcher’s final product. This interest would be akin to a share of
stock. If the researcher’s final product is profitable, that Source has the
choice to either “cash in” his stock, thereby selling his interest back to the
researcher, or to hold on to the interest, such that as profit presumably accrues over time, the Source’s share would increase in value.
As a scientist’s research progresses and more shares are needed for additional Sources, a stock-split can occur, thus ensuring earlier Sources will
be proportionately compensated, while enabling newer Sources to be compensated as well.
An obstacle to this solution, of course, would be to gain legislative
support for such a system. A system of good faith dealing would also be
required between the researcher and the Source. 88 Moreover, Sources
would need to be protected against fraud and deception. However, building on established shareholder principles, and on practices already accepted in society that are similar to Source compensation, the Source
Shareholder system could prove to be a successful means to compensate
Sources proportionally to their contributions, spread the wealth in technology to society, and avoid the evils of selling body parts.
V. SOURCE COMPENSATION: PUBLIC POLICIES AND ETHICAL ISSUES
A. No Exploitation of the Poor
Opponents of Source compensation are concerned with exploitation of
the poor. 89 However, this would only occur if they were induced with
rags-to-riches promises. Particularly with the Source Shareholder solution,
this is not the case, for a number of reasons.
First, the amount of compensation will be dictated by market mechanisms of supply and demand. Until body parts can be manufactured in
laboratories to meet educational, research, and transplant needs, the lucrative market for human body parts will continue. Offering financial incentives will increase the number of willing Sources. With the pressure of
88. This system would prevent, for example, circumstances where Sources’ shares are only worth
pennies while the enormous profit still ends up in the researcher’s pocket.
89. See, e.g., Hardiman, supra note 86, at 239.
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demand eased, Sources will bargain for less consideration in order to stay
competitive. Thus, unless the Source possessed a rare characteristic, he
would not be in a position to bargain for unreasonably high figures.
Second, under this model of compensation, potential Sources are informed that there is a possibility that they will not be compensated at all, if
the research is not profitable. In addition, it is likely that it would take a
long time for a profitable scientific discovery to accumulate wealth.
Therefore, even if impoverished Sources were to invest their body parts,
presumably, they would sell their share soon after it becomes profitable to
gain immediate reward. The prospect of long-term financial return, if any,
thus serves to deter the poor from providing body parts for money. Compensation is meant to be just that—compensation is not a livelihood.
Third, it is unlikely that compensation received for body parts will create overnight millionaires. The premise of compensation is that Sources
take only a share of profits, and it is proportionate to contribution. Thus, if
the contribution is small, it could be reasonable for a Source to agree to
only a fraction of a percent of the researcher’s profits. While some biotechnology discoveries have become enormously profitable, most are only
moderately so. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that the research is altogether fruitless—without the researcher profiting, the Source cannot profit
either. This prospect will likely deter those dreaming of wealth by simply
providing body parts. In fact, an advantage of this system is that it encourages education and public awareness of medical advances. Coupled with
the researcher’s full disclosure, a potential Source may decide that the venture is not promising enough to invest his body parts. Thus, Sources who
educate themselves about biotechnology and research advances are the
ones most likely to be compensated.
Fourth, it should be of little concern that substance abusers would resort to becoming a Source to generate income to support their habits. The
obvious and unfortunate effect of substance abuse is the self-destructive
toll it takes on the body. Damaged or diseased body parts likely will have
little value for research. Additionally, having already established many of
the detrimental effects of substance abuse, the body parts of substance
abusers likely will be unfit for any profitable use.
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B. No Effect on Cost to the Consuming Public
Concerns regarding Source compensation increasing costs to the consuming public are also unfounded. 90 Again, the premise is that Source
compensation is derived from post-consumer profits. Thus, normal increases in pre-consumer costs, for example, in marketing or transporting
the product, would have larger effects on the public. Further, even Congress’ report states: “actual compensation to the human sources of original
tissues and cells is unlikely to have a large economic impact on the use of
human biological materials.” 91
Opponents also argue that because researchers often share work and
findings, having to compensate Sources would interfere with a “free” trade
of information. 92 Further, they contend that if researchers were to share
body parts or derivatives of body parts, keeping detailed records of
Sources’ origins to adequately compensate them would be unduly burdensome. 93 These concerns are exaggerations. Given, additional recordkeeping will be inevitable to ensure Source compensation, but researchers
already maintain meticulous records of medical histories and background
information on Sources, in order to control their experiments for anomalous results. 94 Furthermore, the administrative effort for keeping track of
whose body parts contributed to which products is no more demanding
than the work physicians routinely encounter with respect to organizing
insurance or alternative billing arrangements. As far as interfering with the
“free” trade of information, researchers often credit each other for providing equipment, tools, and other resources that require financial or intellectual investment. Body parts are no different, especially since the original
researcher expends no finances to compensate the Source until a derivative
product proves profitable. From there, patents generate fierce financial
competition between researchers.
C. Strengthens Self-Concept and Physician-Patient Relationship
As discussed, the Source places confidence in the physician-patient relationship. Full disclosure of material information relevant to the treatment
or research, including economic potential, is essential to the trust Sources
90. See, e.g., U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
BIOTECHNOLOGY: OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS—SPECIAL REPORT, OTA-BA-337, at
116 (1987).
91. See id. at 13.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See Hardiman, supra note 86, at 241.
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place in their physician. For a doctor to be bound by the Hippocratic Oath
to disclose personal research interests that may conflict with his professional judgment strengthens the Source’s faith in the physician-patient
relationship. Inherent in that disclosure are also potential risks to Sources,
should they partake in research activities. Thus, it is ultimately up to the
researcher or physician to prevent Sources from endangering their health.
This judgment call is akin to those made in every physician-patient transaction. As such, a breach of this duty subjects the physician or researcher
to sanctions.
Despite the informed consent requirements, Source compensation opponents posture that although not endangering health, society could be
plagued with disfigured people who seek compensation. 95 This issue is
unfounded and far-fetched. As discussed above, compensation does not
promise wealth. In fact, if the research proves fruitless, Sources will not be
compensated at all. Thus, it is unlikely that society will be driven to disfigurement on those grounds. Also, this argument promotes the attitude
that the disfigured or disabled are lesser individuals. There are a multitude
of disabled or disfigured individuals who are contributing, productive
members of society. For instance, despite losing a leg to cancer, Terry Fox
ran over 3,300 miles in 143 days across Canada to raise money for cancer
research before succumbing to the disease. 96 Other examples include
members of the Association of Mouth and Foot Painting Artists (who, as
the name suggests, create paintings by using only their mouth or feet because their hands are unable to do so), 97 and Erik Weihenmayer (who became the first blind person to climb Mt. Everest). 98 Loss of a physical
body part cannot be equated with the loss of identity or self-worth. The
suggestion that vanity-controlled self-esteem issues could result from
Source compensation is no more than speculation and a superficial presumption that does not support a public policy argument.
D. The Protection of Individual Autonomy—The Fairness Argument
Permitting Sources to be compensated proportionally to their contributions to science is consistent with traditional concepts of commercial fairness. It protects their individual autonomy by giving them an enforceable
95. See, e.g., Michelle Bourianoff Bray, Personalizing Personalty: Toward a Property Right in
Human Bodies, 69 TEX. L. REV. 209 (1990).
96. The Terry Fox Foundation, http://www.terryfoxrun.org/english/about%20terry%20fox/default.asp?s=1 (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
97. AMFPA—Association of Mouth and Foot Painting Artists, http://www.aapbp.com/html/
show.php?lang= 2&mid= 100&oid=943 (last visited Oct. 31, 2006).
98. Prove Them Wrong, http://www.provethemwrong.com/weihenmayer.htm (last visited Oct. 31,
2006).
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interest. Furthermore, it prevents a profitable industry, which still receives
extraordinary financial support from the outside, from unjustly enriching
themselves with the exclusive benefit of the Source’s body parts. Scientists wrongfully persuade Sources from many angles to unconditionally
provide body parts. For instance, Sources are often told that removal of
harmful tissues or organs is in itself a form of compensation, and that the
scientists should be able to keep the offending body part in consideration
for its removal. 99 This scenario extends to experiments involving placebos, such that the Source may not be receiving much more than a sugar
pill, whereas the researcher gains valuable scientific data. However, these
persuasions confuse the benefit of treatment with the benefit of being compensated for contributing to a profitable research project.
Sources have also been told that replenishable body parts, such as
blood, are useless to a Source once it has been extracted. 100 Despite the
“uselessness” to the Source, it does not follow that the extraction is of no
value. On one hand, if not for the scientist’s intervention, the body parts
have no independent value, but on the other hand, if not for the Source’s
contribution, the scientist would not have had the means to achieve his
profitable results. Source compensation is not meant to drain financial
resources from fledgling research projects. It seeks to dissolve the inequity
of full reward to the researcher, while ignoring the Source’s contribution.
Thus, these positions are no more than arguments used to persuade the
Source to give away their body parts—in essence, removing the Source’s
bargaining power in an attempt to steal what is already free. Basically, by
robbing body parts, researchers rob Sources of personal autonomy. Returning to Hecht, the court went further than simply recognition of Kane’s
wishes to devise his sperm to his girlfriend; it recognized the autonomy to
control the purpose of one’s body parts or choose the circumstances around
their use. This decision recognizes and enforces rights critical to preserving personal autonomy over one’s body. Thus, regardless of the burden on
the industry, it is a stronger policy interest to uphold equity and protect
Sources from physical and financial exploitation.
VI. FAMILIAR MODELS IN SOCIETY
While Source compensation is not yet an available option, other accepted practices in society suggest that it could and should be adopted. For
instance, employees in certain trades who lose body parts during the scope
99. See U.S. CONG., OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY:
OWNERSHIP OF HUMAN TISSUES AND CELLS—SPECIAL REPORT, OTA-BA-337, at 12 (1987).
100. Id.
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of employment often receive disability benefits through workers’ compensation plans. The loss or injury of a specific body part determines particular payment schedules. 101 Thus, there is an objective appreciation that
body parts have inherent economic value, and furthermore, that different
body parts have different values. Since employment contracts are generally economic compensation in consideration for labor, workers’ compensation recognizes the inequity of an employee putting his body at risk so an
employer may continue to profit, and compensates employees for lost body
parts in the line of duty. It places the economic burden of lost body parts
on the party more capable of bearing that burden, and compensates the
contribution (and at this point, the sacrifice) of the employee. The premise
is similar to Source compensation in medical research, where the amount
of compensation is determined by the body part’s value to both the researcher and the Source. Additionally, under both workers’ compensation
and Source compensation, the economic benefit is not meant to create
wealth.
The field of reproductive health has already established policies to
compensate Sources for eggs, sperm, and even embryos, albeit not for the
body parts per se. With the advent of reproductive technology becoming
safer and more successful, couples who were previously unable to conceive have opened their pocketbooks to Sources for precious life-giving
cells. Traditionally, female Sources providing eggs have been compensated between $1,000-$5,000 for their inconvenience, but in 2001, reports
of compensation of $50,000 were not surprising. 102 Yet, in a similar context, male sources providing sperm are generally only compensated $50. 103
Though economic value in these cases is not determined by profits derived
from their body parts, Sources are at least compensated for the emotional
value of the body parts.
The high price tag for providing life-giving cells is not limited to provision of gametes. In some states, surrogate mothers may be compensated
for expenses beyond those related to pregnancy. 104 Similarly, private
adoption 105 has recently gained acceptance. However, even then it is often
difficult to distinguish between expense reimbursement and compensation

101. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1044(B) (West Supp. 2005); PA. STAT. ANN. § 77-513
(West 2002).
102. See generally Baum, supra note 78, at 108.
103. Interview with Evan E. Follas, General Manager of Follas Labs., Inc., in Indianapolis, Ind. (Nov.
12, 1991).
104. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
105. Private adoption is where the birth mother is compensated for expenses incurred during the
pregnancy, and payments to any intermediaries are limited to costs for professional services. Jana B.
Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1483 (1992).
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unrelated to the pregnancy. 106 It would be naïve to believe that economic
transactions were strictly limited to reimbursement; yet neither legislature
nor the common law has distinguished between them, arguably because
compensation to the birth mother has been deemed “equitable.”
The movement toward Source compensation is evident in the recent
mimicking of surrogate compensation. Furthermore, in 2004, the House of
Representatives overwhelmingly passed a bill to reimburse organ donors
for travel and non-medical expenses. 107 Although the legislation is specifically for Sources providing body parts for transplant surgery, it is a reflection upon shifting governmental appreciation for the value of Sources in
biotechnology.
Public and media opposition against Source compensation for nonreproductive body parts is small compared to opposition against compensation in more sensitive areas, such as reproductive body parts, use of body
parts for gestation, or even adoption. Yet, there are a growing number of
examples of compensation for these sensitive areas. It follows then, that if
society and the law accept compensation as equitable in these circumstances, then certainly where non-reproductive body parts are concerned,
Source compensation should be accepted as well.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is undisputed in the biotechnology industry that human body parts
play a vital role in research. Forbidding the explosion of profits from trickling down to the Source presents an irrational inequity. Despite established
law, it is evident from case analysis and prevailing social practices that
Source compensation is a plausible solution. As long as Sources provide
informed consent to have their body parts extracted for research purposes,
compensating them for contributions to a profitable venture promotes faith
in the physician-patient relationship and fosters individual autonomy. Furthermore, Sources have a right of privacy, and their compensation is a
practice that should be protected under the Constitution.
While opponents cite reasons ranging from economics to ethics, the
advantages of Source compensation outweigh the setbacks. Sources’ financial rewards are likely miniscule compared to those of the scientist,
assuming that there are profits to split at all. Additionally, the Source

106. See, e.g., James B. Boskey, Placing Children for Adoption, in ADOPTION LAW & PRACTICE 3-1,
3-6 (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 1992).
107. Aparna H. Kumar, House Approves Funding to Promote Organ Donations (Mar. 24, 2004),
http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/health/20040324-1116-organdonation.html.
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Shareholder solution minimizes public policy concerns by promoting
Source education and preventing the exploitation of the poor.
Attitudes centered around vanity are exchanged for views that the human body is valuable, and has intrinsic economic worth. In the face of
opposition, a slow-reacting judicial system, and persistent archaic attitudes,
the future of Source compensation is uncertain, but recent governmental
and societal progress is promising: “If there is no struggle, there is no progress.” 108

108. Frederick Douglass, Speech at Canandaigua, New York (Aug. 3, 1857), in 3 THE FREDERICK
DOUGLASS PAPERS: SERIES ONE: SPEECHES, DEBATES, AND INTERVIEWS 204 (John W. Blassingame
ed., 1979).

